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Predatory trading and risk minimisation: how to
(b)eat the competition
Anita Mehta
Abstract We present a model of predatory traders interacting with each other in the
presence of a central reserve (which dissipates their wealth through say, taxation),
as well as inflation. This model is examined on a network for the purposes of corre-
lating complexity of interactions with systemic risk. We suggest the use of selective
networking to enhance the survival rates of arbitrarily chosen traders. Our conclu-
sions show that networking with ’doomed’ traders is the most risk-free scenario,
and that if a trader is to network with peers, it is far better to do so with those who
have less intrinsic wealth than himself to ensure individual, and perhaps systemic
stability.
1 Introduction
The topic of predatory trading and its links with systemic risk is of great contem-
porary interest: at the time of writing this paper, these links have been mentioned
repeatedly in the World Economic Forum at Davos, in addition to having formed the
backbone of the ’Occupy’ movements worldwide. Immense public anger has been
expressed against corporate greed (with predatory trading forming a major way that
this is manifested), and many intellectuals worldwide attribute this to the collapse of
the world economic system. In this paper, we examine these ideas in a more techni-
cal way to see if rigorous mathematical links can be established between these two
concepts.
In order to put our mathematical models in the context of current interdisciplinary
literature, we quote the conclusions of two key papers. First we define predatory
trading along the lines of a recent paper [1], as that which induces and/or exploits
other investors’ need to ’reduce’ their positions. If one trader needs to sell, others
also sell and subsequently buy back the asset, which leads to price overshooting and
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a reduced liquidation value for the distressed trader. In this way, a trader profits from
triggering another trader’s crisis; according to the authors of [1], the crisis can spill
over ’across traders and across markets’. To model this scenario, we invoke a model
of predatory traders in the presence of a central reserve [2], which is principally a
source of wealth dissipation in the form of taxation. We assume that this dissipation
acts uniformly across the traders’ wealth, irrespective of their actual magnitudes.
Among our findings [2] is the fact that when all traders are interconnected and inter-
acting, the entire system collapses, with one or zero survivors. This finds resonance
with the ideas of another key paper [4], where analogies with model ecosystems
have led the authors to conclude that propagating complexity (via the increase of
the number and strength of interactions between different units) can jeopardise sys-
temic stability.
The original model [3] on which [2] is based, was introduced as a model of
complexity. It embodies predator-prey interactions, but goes beyond the best-known
predator-prey model due to Lotka and Volterra by embedding interacting traders in
an active medium; this is a case where the Lotka-Volterra model cannot be sim-
ply applied. As mentioned above, a central reserve bank represents such an active
medium in the case of interacting traders, whose global role is to reduce the value
of held wealth as a function of time [2]. This forms a more realistic social backdrop
to the phenomenon of predatory trading, and it is this model that we study in this
paper. In order to relate it to the phenomenon of systemic risk, we embed the model
on complex networks [5, 6]; these represent a compromise between the unrealistic
extremes of mean field, where all traders interact with all others (too global) and
lattice models, where interaction is confined to local neighbourhoods (too local).
Many real world networks, in spite of their inherent differences, have been found to
have the topology of complex networks [7, 8]; and the embedding of our model on
such networks [9] allows us to probe the relevance of predatory trading to systemic
stability.
The plan of the paper is as follows. First, in Sec. 2, we introduce the model of
interacting traders of varying wealth in the presence of a central reserve, and show
that typically only the wealthiest survive. Next, in Sec. 3, we probe the effect of net-
works: starting with an existing lattice of interacting traders with nearest-neighbour
interactions, we add non-local links between them with probability p [5]. Survivor
ratios are then measured as a function of this ’wiring probability’ p, as p is increased
to reflect the topologies of small world and fully random networks (p = 1). In Sec.
4, we ask the following question: can the destiny of a selected trader be changed
by suitable networking? We probe this systematically by networking a given trader
non-locally with others of less, equal and greater wealth and find indeed that a trader
who would die in his original neighbourhood, is able to change his fate, becoming
a survivor via such selective non-local networking. In Sec. 5, we provide a use-
ful statistical measure of survival, the pairwise probability for a trader to survive
against wealthier neighbours, i.e. to win against the odds. Finally, we discuss the
implications of these results to systemic stability in Sec. 6.
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2 Model
The present model was first used in the context of cosmology to describe the accre-
tion of black holes in the presence of a radiation field [10]. Its applications, however,
are considerably more general; used in the context of economics [2], it manifests an
interesting rich-get-richer behaviour. Here, we review some of its principal proper-
ties [3].
Consider an array of traders with time-dependent wealth mi(t) located at the
sites of a regular lattice. The time evolution of wealth of the traders is given by the
coupled deterministic first order equations,
dmi
dt =
(
α
t
− 1
t1/2 ∑j 6=igi j
dm j
dt
)
mi− 1
mi
. (1)
Here, the parameter α is called the wealth accretion parameter (modelling invest-
ments, savings etc) and gi j defines the strength of the interaction between the traders
mi and m j. The first parenthesis in the R. H. S of Eqn. 1 represents the wealth gain of
the ith trader, which has two components: his wealth gain due to investments/savings
(proportional to α) modulated by dissipation (at the rate of 1/t) due to e.g. taxation,
and his wealth gain due to predatory trading (the second term of Eqn. 1), also mod-
ulated by dissipation (at the rate of 1/t1/2) in the same way. Notice in the second
term, that the loss of the other traders corresponds to the gain of the ith trader, so
that each trader ’feeds off’ the others, thus justifying the name ’predatory trading’.
The last term, −1/mi, represents the loss of the ith trader’s wealth through inflation
to the surroundings; we will see that this term ensures that those without a threshold
level of wealth ’perish’, as in the case of those individuals in society who live below
the poverty line. Here and in the following we will use words such as ’dying’ or
’perishing’ to connote the bankruptcy/impoverishment, of a trader and conversely,
’life’ will be associated with financial survival, i.e. solvency.
A logarithmic time is introduced in the study for convenience. We define a scaled
time s = ln(t/t0), where t0 is some initial time. Similarly, for convenience, we
rescale wealth to be Xi = mi/t1/2. Using the new variables, Eqn. 1 can be rewrit-
ten as,
dXi
ds ≡ X
′
i =
(
2α− 1
2
−∑
j 6=i
gi j
(
X j
2
+X ′ j
))
Xi− 1Xi , (2)
where the primes denote differentiation performed with respect to s.
Continuing our recapitulation of the results of the model [3], we consider a sce-
nario where there is a single isolated trader, whose initial (’inherited’) wealth is
X0. Under the dynamics defined by Eqn. 2, the trader will survive financially only if
X0 >X⋆(=
√
2
2α−1) (this imposes the condition α > 1/2 [3]), else he will eventually
go bankrupt (see Fig. 1). Next, consider a system of two traders with equal initial
wealth; here, there exists a critical coupling gc such that for g < gc the two traders
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Fig. 1 (color online) The plots show the evolution of individual non-interacting traders with a
range of initial wealth obeying Eqn. 2. Traders with initial wealth X0 greater than X⋆ live forever,
or else they die in time. Here α = 1.0, therefore X⋆ =
√
2
2α−1 =
√
2.
both survive, provided that their individual inherited wealth is greater than X⋆. For
two unequally wealthy traders (X1 < X2, say), the poorer trader goes bankrupt first
at time s1; the richer one either survives (if his wealth at time s1, X2(s1), exceeds the
threshold X⋆) or goes bankrupt (if X2(s1) < X⋆). The main inferences are twofold:
the wealthier predatory trader ’consumes’ the poorer one’s wealth in due course, and
then survives or not depending on whether his own wealth at that point is enough
to tide him through its eventual dissipation through taxes and inflation. We thus
see that this relatively simple model captures not just the mechanism of predatory
trading, but also includes the flavour of more sophisticated concepts like inherited
wealth, taxation and inflation.
Consider the limit of an infinitely large number of traders all connected to each
other; this represents a limiting mean field regime, with fully collective behaviour
involving long-range interactions. For g > gc, all but the wealthiest will eventually
go bankrupt. In the weak coupling regime (g < gc) on the other hand, the dynamics
consist of two successive stages [3]. In Stage I, the traders behave as if they were
isolated from each other (but still in the presence of the reserve); they get richer (or
go bankrupt ) quickly if their individual wealth is greater (or less) than the threshold
X⋆. In Stage II, slow, collective and predatory dynamics leads to a scenario where
again, only the single wealthiest trader survives. This weakly interacting mean field
regime shows the presence of two well-separated time scales, a characteristic fea-
ture of glassy systems [11]. The separation into two stages embodies an interest-
ing physical/sociological scenario: the first stage is fast, and each trader survives
or ’dies’ only on the basis of his inherited wealth, so that everyone without this
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threshold wealth is already eliminated before the second stage sets in. Competition
and predatoriness enter only in the second stage, when the wealthier feast off their
poorer competitors progressively, until there is only overlord left. This is a perfect
embodiment of systemic risk, as the entire system collapses, with only one survivor
remaining [2].
Similar glassy dynamics also arise when the model is solved on a periodic lattice
with only nearest-neighbour interactions. The dynamical equations in Eqn. 2 take
the form :
X ′n =
(
2α− 1
2
+ g∑
m
(
1
Xm
−αXm
))
Xn− 1Xn , (3)
by keeping the terms upto first order in g [3]. Here, m runs over the z nearest neigh-
bours of the site n, where for a one-dimensional ring topology, z = d, while z = 2d
for a two-dimensional lattice – these are the two cases we consider here. We sum-
marize earlier results [3] on the dynamics: In Stage I, traders evolve independently
and (as before) only those whose initial wealth Xi(s = 0) exceeds the threshold X⋆,
survive. In Stage II, the dynamics are slow and collective, with competition and
predatoriness setting in: however, an important difference with the earlier fully con-
nected case is that there can be several survivors, provided that these are isolated
from each other by defunct or bankrupt traders (i.e. no competitors remain within
their effective domain). Their number asymptotes to a constant S∞ (Fig. 2), and these
’isolated overlords’ survive forever. The moral of the story is therefore that in the
presence of predatory dynamics, interaction-limiting ’firewalls’ can help avoid sys-
temic collapse: conversely, full globalisation with predatory dynamics makes sys-
temic collapse inevitable. Apart from providing quantitative support for the conclu-
sions of [4], this underscores the necessity of economic firewalls for the prevention
of systemic risk [12].
Following the mean field scenario, where the wealthiest trader is the only sur-
vivor, it is natural to ask if this would also hold when the range of interactions is
limited. Somewhat surprisingly, this turns out not always to be the case, with non-
trivial and counter-intuitive survivor patterns being found often [9]. While one can
certainly rule out the survival of a trader whose initial wealth is less than threshold
(X⋆), many-body interactions can then give rise to extremely complex dynamics in
Stage II for traders with X > X⋆. This points to the existence of ways of winning
against the odds to (b)eat the competition, when interactions are limited in range; in
the remainder of this paper, we use selective networking as a strategy to achieve this
aim.
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Fig. 2 The survival ratio S(s) plotted as a function of reduced time s, for traders distributed in a
regular one-dimensional lattice of size 100,000. In Stage I, traders grow independently, while in
Stage II the growth is collective. Here, S1 = 0.8 is the survival ratio at the end of Stage I and S∞ is
the asymptotic survival ratio.
3 Traders in complex networks
In this section, we examine the mechanisms of selective networking: a particularly
interesting example to consider is the class of small-world networks. These have the
property that long- and short-range interactions can coexist; such networks also con-
tain ‘hubs’, where certain sites are preferentially endowed with many connections.
Small-world networks can be constructed by starting with regular lattices, adding
links randomly with probability p to their sites [5] and then freezing them, so that
the average degree of the sites is increased for all p > 0.
3.1 One-dimensional ring and two-dimensional square lattices
Consider a regular one-dimensional ring lattice of size N = 2000. To start with, the
wealth of the traders located on the lattice sites evolve according to Eqn. 3, where
the interactions are with nearest neighbours only. Next, the lattice is modified by
adding new links between sites chosen randomly with an associated probability p.
For p = 0, the network is ordered, while for p = 1, the network becomes completely
random.
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Fig. 3 (Color online) The plots of S(s) as a function of reduced time s, for increasing values of
wiring probabilities p. The 1-cycle scheme is shown in (a) for a 1-dimensional ring and (c) for a
2-dimensional square lattice. The 5-cycle scheme is shown in (b) for a 1-dimensional ring and (d)
for a 2-dimensional square lattice. The insets in all the figures show the asymptotic survival ratios
S∞ as a function of the probability p. Here, the system size for the 1-d ring is 2000 and for the 2-d
square lattice it is 50×50 - all our data is averaged over 10 random network configurations.
In the first scheme [9], we add links probabilistically starting with site i = 1 and
end with i = N, only once: we call this the 1-cycle scheme. The survival ratios of
traders as a function of reduced time s for different values of wiring probability p
are presented in Fig. 3(a). Consider the p = 0 case, which corresponds to a regular
lattice; here the survival ratio S(s) shows two stages, Stage I and Stage II, in its evo-
lution. For all values of 0< p≤ 1, the existence of these well-separated Stages I and
II is also observed. There is a noticeable fall in the survivor ratio as p is increased,
though; this is clearly visible in the asymptotic values S∞(p) plotted with respect to
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Fig. 4 The plot of asymptotic survival ratios S∞(s) as a function of the probabilities p for 1- and
5-cycle schemes in 1 and 2 dimensions. The error bars for all the graphs do not exceed 0.003 and
are smaller than the plot symbols.
p in the inset of Fig. 3(a). As p increases, the number of links increases, leading to
more interaction and competition between the traders, and hence a decrease in the
number of survivors [4]. As expected, this behaviour interpolates between the two
characteristic behaviours relevant to the regular lattice and mean field scenarios.
Next we implement the 5-cycle scheme [9], where the rewiring is done five times.
Figure 3(b) shows the survivor ratio S(s) as a function of s, where a clear decrease
of S(s) for increasing p. The asymptotic survival ratios S∞ for the 1- and 5-cycle
schemes are shown in the insets of Fig. 3(a) and (b) respectively, with a clear de-
crease of S∞ as p increases. In addition, the survivor ratio in the 5-cycle scheme is
consistently smaller than in the 1-cycle scheme, for all p.
The above procedures are repeated for a two-dimensional square lattice of size
50× 50 [9], and survival ratios obtained as a function of s for the 1- and 5-cycle
schemes (see Figs. 3(c)-(d)). The asymptotic survivor ratios for these two cases are
shown in the insets of Figs. 3(c)-(d); they follow a decreasing trend with increasing
p, similar to the 1d case. Finally, we plot the asymptotic survival ratios of the 1- and
5-cycle schemes in 1d and 2d, in Fig. 4.
All the above simulations reinforce one of the central themes of this paper, that
economic firewalls are good ways to avoid systemic collapse in a predatory scenario,
since the more globalised the interactions, the greater the systemic risk [4].
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Fig. 5 (Color online) (a) The central trader here is a survivor in his original configuration. (b)
The asymptotic wealth of the central trader diverges with increasing connectivity to eventual non-
survivors.
4 Networking strategies: the Lazarus effect
Since the central feature of this model is the survival of traders against the competi-
tion, it is of great interest to find a smart networking strategy which can change the
fate of a trader, for example, by reviving a ’dying’ trader to life – we call this the
Lazarus [13] effect.
We systematically investigate the effect of adding a finite number of non-local
connections to a chosen central trader. In [9], it was shown that the growth or decay
of the wealth of a trader is solely dictated by its relative rate of change versus the cu-
mulative rate of change of its neighbours’ wealth. The key to better survival should
therefore lie in choosing to network with traders whose wealth is decaying strongly.
We accordingly divide all possible non-local connections into two classes: class A
comprises eventual non-survivors (X < X⋆), while class B comprises would-be sur-
vivors (X > X⋆) ). In the next subsection, we look at the outcome of networking with
members of class A.
4.1 Non-local connections with eventual non-survivors (Xi < X⋆)
Recall that non-survivors (X < X⋆) die very early during Stage I. In connecting such
traders to a given trader with X > X⋆, we can be sure that they will never be able to
compete with him, much less run him out of business.
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Let us consider a central trader who is an eventual survivor, as shown in Fig. 5.
We now let him network with eventual non-survivors from all over the lattice, and
record the growth of his wealth as a function of the number of traders in his network;
the results are shown in Fig. 5 (b). When all the neighbours go out of business, their
contribution in Eqn. 3 is zero, leading to the exponential solution shown in Fig. 5 (b).
The wealth of the central trader increases markedly as more and more small traders
are connected to him, making him an even wealthier survivor asymptotically.
(a)
.
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final
final
(b)
No extra connections
Regular: only 4 connections
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Fig. 6 (Color online) (a) The central trader goes bankrupt in his original configuration without
extra connections. He becomes a survivor after linking up with more and more non-survivors. (b) A
crossover is seen here as the central trader is returned to (financial) ’life’, his wealth Xcm increasing
with increasing connections to non-surviving traders (X < X⋆).
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We now use this observation to return a ’dying’ trader to life. Figure 6 shows
our results: the central trader would eventually have gone bankrupt in his original
environment, but on adding 100 small traders (whose wealth X <X⋆) to his network,
he comes back to solvency: further additions , e.g. 200 or 364 such traders, evidently
make him an even wealthier survivor (Fig. 6 (b)). Thus, networking with eventual
non-survivors is the surest way to invoke the Lazarus effect on a ’dying’ trader.
4.2 Networking with would-be survivors Xi > X⋆
Choosing to network with traders whose intrinsic wealth is greater than X⋆ could
turn out to be rather delicate. The financial lifespan of such traders will certainly
exceed Stage I: and depending on their individual environments, they could either
survive through Stage II with a positive growth rate, or die as a result of a negative
growth rate. Networking with such traders is like playing Russian roulette.
Consider first non-local connections with would-be survivors (Xi > X⋆) who are
poorer than our chosen trader (Xi < Xcm). Such would-be survivors will live beyond
Stage I, their wealth showing at least initially a positive growth rate (Fig. 1). From a
mean field perspective, we would therefore expect to see a decrease in the chances of
survival of the chosen trader as it networks with more and more would-be survivors.
Figure 7 shows a sample scenario, where the central trader is connected non-
locally with would-be survivors who are poorer than himself. In Fig. 7 (a) the central
trader networks with 6 would-be survivors and is able to survive asymptotically
(Fig. 7 (b) ). On the other hand, adding one more would-be survivor (Fig. 7 (c)) to
the existing network of the central trader, causes him to go out of business at long
times (Fig. 7 (d)). As the central trader is made bankrupt by the arrival of the new
connection, the fates of some of his other links are also changed (cf. Figs. 7 (b) and
(d)).
To understand the dynamics, we present the rates of growth for another sample
scenario in Fig. 8. An increase in the number of non-local connections with would-
be survivors, leads to a fall in the absolute value of Xcm as well as its rate of growth
X ′cm. Beyond a certain number of networked contacts, the wealth of the central trader
begins to decay, and eventually vanishes. This crossover from life to death happens
when the cumulative rate of the wealth growth of the neighbours ΣX ′i, j is larger
than that of the central trader X ′cm. Unfortunately, however, the intricate many-body
nature of this problem precludes a prediction of when such crossovers might occur
in general.
Finally, in the case where a given trader networks with would-be survivors who
are richer than himself (Xi > X⋆ and Xi > Xcm), one would expect a speedier ’death’.
One such sample scenario is depicted in Fig. 9 and the corresponding rates of evo-
lution of the traders’ wealth in Fig. 10. We notice that in his original configuration
with four neighbours (n = 4)), the central trader is a survivor. As we increase the
number of networked connections, the growth rate of his wealth gets stunted; there
is a substantial fall for 2 extra links (n = 6 in Fig. 10). Adding one more link (n= 7)
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Fig. 7 The central trader is networked with would-be survivors (Xi > X⋆) who are poorer than him-
self (Xi < Xcm). (a) The initial configuration, where the central trader has 6 non-local connections,
(b) the asymptotic state with the only survivor being the central trader. (c) With the linkage of one
more non-local trader to the existing configuration (d) the central trader goes bankrupt. In (b) and
(d), the open (dark) circles represent asymptotic non-survivors (survivors).
does the final damage; the central trader goes bankrupt. The rates shown in Fig.
10 (b) and (c) for n = 6 and n = 7 connections vividly capture the competition for
survival, leading to solvency in one case and bankruptcy in the other.
As expected, we observe that fewer connections (here, n = 7) are needed, com-
pared to the earlier case with smaller would-be survivors (n = 11), to eliminate the
chosen trader. In closing, we should of course emphasise that the n values mentioned
here are illustrative.
5 Survivor distributions and rare events
We have seen that the safest strategy for the Lazarus effect is to network with even-
tual non-survivors, i.e. those who will never get past Stage I. It is also relatively safe
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to network with would-be survivors, provided they are poorer than oneself. (This
would explain why multinationals are not afraid to enter an arena where smaller-
size retailers predominate, for example). However, in this section we consider rare
events, where the wealthiest trader in a given neighbourhood dies marginally, and a
poorer one survives against the odds.
We look first at the four immediate neighbours of a given trader, and consider
their pairwise interactions with him. Clearly, had such a pair been isolated, the larger
trader would have won [3]. However, many-body interactions in the lattice mean that
this is not always true. We therefore ask the question: what is the proportion of cases
where the poorer trader wins?
Each survivor has four neighbours; we first calculate the probability distribution
of the initial wealth differences in a pairwise fashion between a survivor and each
of his neighbours. The initial wealth differences are given by δXi = Xcm−Xi (i =
1,2,3,4) corresponding to the four neighbours - right, left, bottom and top - of a
survivor. The distribution of δXi for all the survivors is shown in Fig. 11. Here, a
negative δXi means that the survivor is poorer than his neighbour, and conversely
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Fig. 8 (Color online)The central trader is networked with traders whose Xn > X⋆. In (a) the growth
of Xcm with an increasing number of connections is plotted - n = 4 corresponds to a regular lattice.
There is a crossover seen when the number of connections increases from n = 10 to n = 11; for
larger n values, the central site goes bankrupt. This observation is supported by the rates of growth
of Xcm and its neighbours Xn (b) when n = 10 and (c) when n = 11.
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Fig. 9 The central trader is networked with would-be survivors (Xi > X⋆) that are wealthier than
himself(Xi >Xcm). (a) The initial configuration with 2 non-local connections, (b) and its asymptotic
state; the only survivor here is the central trader. (c) With the addition of one more non-local trader
to the existing configuration (d) the central trader goes bankrupt. In (b) and (d), the open (dark)
circles represent asymptotic non-survivors (survivors).
for positive δXi. All four distributions corresponding to four neighbouring pairs
overlap due to isotropy; the resulting distributions are universal functions of wealth
differences, depending only on µ .
We also obtain the cumulative wealth difference between survivors and all of
their four neighbours viz. 4Xcm−∑4i=1 Xi = ∑4i=1 δXi (see Fig. 12). The distributions
of ∑4i=1 δi are plotted in Fig. 12 for different values of µ . For a positive cumulative
wealth difference we know that the survivor is richer than his neighbours, matching
our intuition based on the mean-field regime. The negative side of the distribution
is more interesting, comprising traders who are poorer than their four neighbours
combined, and who have won against the odds.
Notice that both the survivor-neighbour pair distribution (Fig. 11), and the
survivor- all neighbours cumulative distribution (Fig. 12) get broader with increas-
ing µ . This is because increasing µ = − log(S1)/X⋆ [3] increases the number of
potential survivors S1 beyond Stage 1. In each case, the fraction of area under the
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negative side of the survivor pair-distribution gives an estimate of survivors against
the odds – an example of some of the rare events alluded to at the beginning of this
section.
Figure 13 shows this fraction, both in terms of individual survivor-pair distri-
butions and cumulative distributions, as a function of the µ of the initial wealth
distribution, for different system sizes. There are more survivors, hence more sur-
vivors against the odds, leading to an increase in the fraction plotted on the y-axis
of Fig. 13 for both distributions. For the largest system size, there is full isotropy in
the pairwise distributions; the probability of finding a survivor against the odds is
now seen to be a regular and universal function of µ in both pairwise and cumu-
lative cases, relying only on wealth differences rather than on wealth. Finally, the
cumulative distribution gives a more stringent survival criterion than the pairwise
one, as is to be expected from the global nature of the dynamics.
A major conclusion to be drawn from Fig. 13 is the following: there are traders
who are eliminated against the odds (traders who are wealthier than the eventual
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Fig. 10 (Color online) The central trader of a configuration given in Fig. 9(b) is connected with
non-local traders with Xn > Xcm . In (a) the growth of Xcm with an increasing number of connections
is plotted - n = 4 corresponds to a regular lattice. There is a crossover seen when the number of
connections increases from n = 6 to n = 7; for larger n values, the central trader goes bankrupt.
This observation is supported by the rates of growth of the wealth of the central trader, Xcm, and
that of its neighbours Xn, (b) when n = 6 and (c) when n = 7.
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Fig. 11 The plots show the distribution of pairwise wealth differences between survivors and their
four neighbours. They are obtained for exponential distributions of initial wealth with different
mean values 1/µ , where µ =− log(S1)/X⋆. The plots are for (a) 1/µ = 3.92 (S1 = 0.6) (b) 5.607
(S1 = 0.7) (c) 8.963 (S1 = 0.8) and (d) 18.982 (S1 = 0.9). The system size is 400×400.
survivor). These should be easier to revive (as they have failed marginally) by selec-
tive networking than those who have failed because they are indeed worse off. This
question is of real economic relevance, and its mathematical resolution seems to us
to be an important open problem.
6 Discussion
We have used the model of [3] to investigate two related issues in this paper on
predatory trading [2]: first, that of systemic risk in the presence of increasing in-
teractions, and next, the use of selective networking to prevent financial collapse.
As long-range connections are introduced with probability 0 < p < 1 to individ-
ual traders [9], we find that the qualitative features of the networked system remain
the same as that of the regular case. The presence of two well-separated dynami-
cal stages is retained, and the glassy dynamics and metastable states of [3] persist.
However, the number of survivors decreases as expected with increasing p, quanti-
Predatory trading and risk minimisation: how to (b)eat the competition 17
=S
S1 =
=1S
=S1
1
fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Σ δ
i
 400
 800
 1200
 1600 0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
 0
−100 −50  0  50  100  150  200
Fig. 12 (Color online) The plots show the distribution of wealth differences between survivors
and all of their four neighbours. They are obtained for exponential distributions of initial wealth
with different mean values 1/µ , where µ =− log(S1)/X⋆. The plot in ‘red’ represents the case for
1/µ = 3.92 (S1 = 0.6), ‘green’ represents 1/µ = 5.607 (S1 = 0.7), ‘blue’ represents 1/µ = 8.963
(S1 = 0.8), and ‘pink’ represents 1/µ = 18.982 (S1 = 0.9). The system size is 400×400.
tatively validating the thesis if [4]; and systemic risk is far greater as the complexity
of interactions is increased. This view finds resonance with the present economic
scenario, where it appears that some measure of insulation via economic firewalls,
is needed to prevent individual, and hence eventually systemic, collapse.
Another central result of this paper is the use of smart networking strategies
to modify the fate of an arbitrary trader. We find that it is safest to network with
eventual non-survivors; their decay and eventual death lead to the transformation of
the destiny of a given site, from bankruptcy to solvency, or from solvency to greater
solvency. Networking with peers, or with those who are born richer, in general leads
to the weakening of one’s own finances, and an almost inevitable bankruptcy, given
a predatory scenario.
However, the above is not immutable: the probability distributions in the last
section of the paper indicate an interesting universality of survival ‘against the odds’.
It would be interesting to find a predictive way of financial networking that would
enable such a phenomenon to occur both at the individual, and at the societal, level.
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